

CONFIDENTIAL

DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
Security Committee

SECOM-D-232

6 September 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

VIA: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Director, Intelligence Community Staff
Deputy Director, Intelligence Community Staff

FROM: [redacted]

25X1

Chairman

SUBJECT: Senator Proxmire's 27 August Letter

1. Action Requested: That you telephone Senator Proxmire, in lieu of a written response to his letter, and advise him that public disclosure of Intelligence Community security posture does not seem prudent.

2. Background and Discussion: The assurances requested in Senator Proxmire's letter are impossible to give. Former DCI Walter Bedell Smith was quoted by the New York Times of 1 October 1952 as saying "Any intelligence agency would be foolishly complacent if it did not assume that it would be penetrated some time, somewhere."

3. It would be preferable for you to telephone Senator Proxmire and advise him that it is unwise, from a counterintelligence standpoint, to reveal publicly the full extent of the Intelligence Community security program. To do less would be to give a false picture of our efforts to guard against penetration and the exploitation of our personnel. The program will, in the long run, speak for itself regardless of what assurances may be given. To proclaim our invulnerability would be intemperate. Any hint that we are not invulnerable, on the other hand, would not serve the purpose sought by Senator Proxmire.

4. Recommendation: It is recommended that you telephonically express your appreciation of Senator Proxmire's intentions, but decline to write the requested letter for the above reasons.

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Attachment

Senator Proxmire's 27 AUG 85 letter

cc: D/OLL (Attn: [redacted] w/att
ICS/LL, w/att)

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SUBJECT: Senator Proxmire's 27 August Letter

CONCUR:

Deputy Director, Intelligence Community Staff

Date

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A/ Director, Intelligence Community Staff

19 SEP 1985

Date

/s/ John N. McMahon
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

25 SEP 1985

Date

APPROVED:

/s/ William J. Casey
Director of Central Intelligence

08 OCT 1985

Date

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Executive Registry

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United States Senate

COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS
WASHINGTON, DC 20510

August 27, 1985

Hon. William J. Casey
Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505

Dear Mr. Casey:

The current spy scandal in West Germany suggests that there has been long term damage to West German and possible NATO intelligence operations. Not only has the collection of foreign intelligence been adversely affected but also Western counter-intelligence operations.

Obviously the extent of this damage will be known only to a few in West Germany and here in the United States. But the American public, reading of the defections and probable compromise of highly classified Alliance secrets, must be uneasy about the potential for such penetration of U.S. intelligence agencies.

I understand that there are extensive safeguards against hostile penetration of our intelligence agencies such as use of the lie detector, background checks, and monitoring of personnel. But the lesson of the West German incident seems to be that obvious signals were overlooked by the highest authorities—perhaps because of long standing personal relationships.

In order to reassure the American public, would you consider discussing this problem in an unclassified response to this letter indicating where possible the efforts you have taken to insure that such a penetration and compromise of U.S. agencies on this scale is unlikely or impossible? I believe that some positive statement on your part would go long way to dispelling a growing feeling among Americans that we too are riddled with agents from the Warsaw Pact countries.

Any discussion of this issue would be appreciated.

(Sincerely,

William Proxmire, U.S.S.

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